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Introduction 
The changing profile of the UK charity sector after the contracting out of public services 
has been categorised by Bruce & Chew as a ‘marketisation’ effect (2011). The marketisation trend in 
the UK echoes that of other developed western economies, such as the US, where market-based 
principles have been applied to reform public services (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). Whereas 
previously statutory funding was delivered by way of grants, now the move is toward the use of 
contracts (McKay et al., 2015). 
It is argued that a considerable flow of public funds into the UK charity sector has resulted 
in charities altering their behaviour by having to focus on priorities identified by government, operate 
in ways prescribed by government, and provide performance data to government under contractual 
terms and conditions (Hyndman & Jones, 2011). With some of the larger charities receiving as much 
as 90% of their income from government, arguments are made that they have become ‘extensions of 
the state’ (Sergeant, 2016). 
The basic strategy of marketisation is to ‘strengthen governance by competition’ leading to 
greater efficiency (Hansen & Lindholst, 2016). However, the UK Government is becoming 
increasingly concerned about the way the charity sector is governed: ‘It is vital that we prioritise 
investing in organisation and development, building stronger leadership and governance’ Rob Wilson, 
Minister for Civil Society (Sharman, 2016). The chair of the Charity Commission has recently warned 
the sector of the need to have ‘proper’ governance processes in place to guard against further scandals 
(Shawcross, 2016). These thoughts are also echoed by governance consultancies in the UK ‘Our 
leading charities have developed the footprint and influence of multinational businesses yet from the 
information disclosed it appears that their governance frameworks may not have kept pace’ (Grant 
Thornton, 2013).  
Methodology 
The aim of this study was to analyse and evaluate the ‘marketisation’ of the UK charity 
sector and to consider its effect on governance and performance. A robust regression analysis was 
conducted of financial statement data, taken from a full set of the Charity Commission England & 
Wales database, over three years from 2011 to 2013. The total income analysed represents £151 
billion and constitutes 27,424 sets of financial statements. For further information on the regression 
model specification and identification of dependent and independent variables please refer to the 
APPENDIX on page 12. 
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Results 
Evidence was found of marketisation and it was shown to be delivering ‘loosely coupled’ 
financial efficiencies in the UK charity sector. Results of the regression analysis of the full financial 
data set showed a weak-form correlation between the level of contract income and operational 
efficiency, as defined by the traditional passthrough metric, with a 0.9% increase in efficiency 
observed for a corresponding 10% increase in contract income, significant at 1% (see robust 
regression results TABLE III in the APPENDIX on page 17).  
This would suggest that charities driven by contractual obligations are marginally more 
likely to ensure the majority of income is passing through to beneficiaries rather than cost savings 
contributing toward surplus funds. It would point toward a focus of attention on charitable goals 
rather than the commercial behaviour of creating margins. Having to focus on priorities identified by 
the contract, and provide considerable amounts of performance data under contractual terms and 
conditions, appears to be to some extent increasing the focus on beneficiary outcomes. However, 
weak-form and intermittent efficiencies alone do not adequately explain the continuing drive of 
marketisation in the UK. The institutional model (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Hansen, 2010) and the need for ‘legitimacy of form’ provide an explanation for the continued push 
toward internal markets (see FIGURE A on following page). 
Ironically, commercially aggressive behaviours within the UK sector have challenged the 
public’s perception of charities. Public trust in charities is at its lowest since records began in 2005 
(Weakley, 2016) and they have become the focus of public scrutiny following high profile, 
fundraising scandals (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2016) and organisational failures 
(BBC, 2016).  
The financial regression analysis used the level of advertising expenditure as a proxy 
indicator of the level of competition experienced by charities. This was based on the premise that 
costs associated with generating donations, such as advertising expenditure, would rise as charities 
needed to compete harder for donor income. Correlations were found between levels of advertising 
and a focus on commercialised behaviour through the pursuit of creating margins (βeta of 0.045***) 
at the expense of passthrough to beneficiary services (βeta of 1.021***). 
The erosion of the distinctive values and ethos of the third sector through mimetic 
isomorphism was a ‘concern’ raised around the introduction of the Big Society Initiative in 2010 
(House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2011).  As the charity sector evolves 
into a marketised version, isomorphic behaviours may become mimetic rather than normative, as 
charities imitate commercial behaviours with the aim of improving cost efficiencies, rather than 
attempting to signal (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) social fitness through the 
3 
 
traditional means of lower salaries and suitable ‘ethical’ behaviours. Results from the financial 
regression analysis would appear to substantiate this idea. Correlations were found between levels of 
expenditure on governance and a commercial style emphasis on creating cost efficiencies and margins 
(βeta of 0.528***) at the expense of passthrough to beneficiaries (βeta of 1.274***).  
FIGURE A: Theoretical Drivers of Marketisation 
 
 
 
Theoretical Drivers of Marketisation 
Open-Systems Theory 
Organisations adopt efficiency driven 
processes to succeed in a competitive 
environment (Thompson 1967; 
Lawrence & Lorsh 1969; Mintzberg 
1979) 
Institutional Theory 
Emphasis on legitimacy and hegemonic 
ideologies (Meyer & Rowan 1977; 
DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Brunsson 
1989; Orton & Weick 1990; Powell & 
DiMaggio 1991) 
Problem Solving Model 
 
Innovation is driven by concerns for 
efficiency and performance (Tullock 
1965; Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971; 
Hansen 2010) 
 
Efficiency 
 
Legitimacy 
 
Institutional Model 
Institutional pressures (coercive, mimetic 
and normative mechanisms) encourage 
organisations to adopt strategies 
reflecting neo-liberal ideology (Meyer & 
Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; 
Brunsson 1989; Orton & Weick 1990; 
Powell & DiMaggio 1991; Hansen 2010) 
 
Expectation: 
 
Correlation between marketisation 
and efficiency as competitive forces 
encourage charities to lower costs 
and increase efficiencies        
(Hansen 2010) 
Expectation: 
 
‘Loose coupling’ (no significant 
relationship) between marketisation 
and efficiency as the primary focus is 
the legitimacy of institutional form 
(Hansen 2010) 
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What are the implications for accountability and how might legitimacy be restored to the 
model?  
Research is now incorporating a broader concept of ‘accountability’ due to a realisation that 
organisations have an impact on a wider variety of groups in society, and in reflection of this, there 
has been a broadening of research looking at transparency and stakeholder inclusivity. A charity exists 
to provide a much-needed service to beneficiaries as key stakeholders. It must fulfil its purpose, and 
from a legal perspective pursue its objects, in order to remain a going concern. There are no owners of 
a charity and no residual assets after a dissolution, so we cannot conceptualise this type of 
organisation in a standard, private sector way. Following this conceptual line suggests validity in the 
role of government when ‘steering’ behaviour. There is an oversight void where owner interests or 
institutional shareholders might play a role in the oversight of corporations in traditional markets. A 
lack of adequate direction from legislators and regulators could result in organisations developing 
their own internal versions of governance procedures and ‘internal colonisation’ (Habermas, 1987).  
The role of the trustee in charity governance is changing as the dynamism of the sector 
increases. The skill set of the trustee board needs to reflect the demanding environment within which 
it operates and it is important to maintain an awareness of factors that might influence the planning 
horizon, such as regulatory changes and the risk of reputational damage. ‘Executive leadership has 
improved immeasurably, but board leadership hasn’t changed’ Sir Stephen Bubb, Chief Executive of 
ACEVO (Civil Society, 2016). The matter of responsibility and accountability is a major one for a 
charity trustee. If things go wrong trustees may find themselves personally liable for payment of any 
financial losses: ‘Trustees can be held liable to their charity for any financial loss they cause or help to 
cause’ (Charity Commission, 2015, 32).  
However, the professional reputation of a trustee is also damaged when their charities face 
problems over incurred debt or losses. The financial issues are not the only damages incurred. These 
risks are likely to act as a deterrent for any potential trustee when considering taking on, what is a 
very responsible and yet unpaid role: ‘…they must give enough time, thought and energy to their 
duties as trustees, and make reasonable use of their skills and experience’ (Charity Commission, 2012, 
28). There has been a recent ‘crisis’ of confidence in the UK charity sector, with public trust in 
charities is at its lowest since records began in 2005, and charities being trusted less than ‘members of 
the general public’ (Weakley, 2016).  The level of complexity involved in the trustee role, combined 
with the fact it is a part-time commitment, and the information asymmetry suffered in comparison to 
executives, leaves them heavily exposed.  
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Traditionally, charities have benefited from a moral legitimacy bestowed upon them by 
society because of their philanthropic activity and charitable ethos. The marketisation of the sector, 
and subsequent changes in behaviour, have eroded public belief in their moral legitimacy. To regain 
societal legitimacy, a more balanced approach is required, supplementing organisational legitimacy 
with pragmatic and cognitive forms. Certain stakeholders will not transact with illegitimate 
organisations and that legitimacy directly affects market access: ‘…no matter what the components of 
the marketing mix illegitimate organisations offer, a substantial group of stakeholders will not transact 
with them’ (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, 64).  
Legitimacy Guidelines are abstract constructs embedded within society such as norms, 
values and social rules (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Drawing upon a Habermasian (1984; 1987) 
approach, these terms add to the general narrative around social constructs and what our society 
determines to be acceptable behaviour and why. It is interesting to observe that as the regulator 
(legitimacy agent) takes a step back from steering behaviour directly through a definitive governance 
code, then legitimacy mediators (general and social media) become increasingly involved in, and 
critical of, behaviours exhibited in an attempt to influence charitable organisations and the way they 
are governed. 
Moral legitimacy is not based upon the audiences’ self-interest, as in the case of pragmatic 
legitimacy, but on the audiences socially constructed value system. ‘Unlike pragmatic legitimacy, 
moral legitimacy is “sociotropic” – it rests not on judgements about whether a given activity benefits 
the evaluator, but rather on judgements about whether the activity is “the right thing to do” (Suchman, 
1995, 579). Gaining moral legitimacy may be undertaken through conforming to ideals and setting 
goals that align with ethical behaviours (Suchman, 1995). 
Where organisational action affects an audience, the legitimacy of the action taken is 
determined by the audience in relation to the consequences for themselves. Hence, Suchman (1995) 
describes pragmatic legitimacy as resting ‘…on the self-interested calculations of an organisation’s 
most immediate audiences’ (Suchman, 1995, 578). Gaining pragmatic legitimacy may be attempted 
through responding to constituents’ needs and demands and building a reputation. Advertising may 
also be used to promote a specific image and locate friendly audiences (Suchman, 1995). 
Cognitive legitimacy is not based on self-interest (pragmatic) or evaluation (moral) but is 
something that is accepted as necessary or inevitable through a cognitive process (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994). This may be something that is culturally ‘taken for granted’ and a ‘given priority’ (Suchman, 
1995). Gaining cognitive legitimacy may be attempted through conforming to standards of 
professionalised behaviour. Certification of confirmation to standards enhances legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995).  
To gain further cognitive legitimacy charities might formalise operations and operate to 
higher standards. They might seek greater certification and mimic other organisations perceived to be 
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of high cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).  To increase levels of pragmatic legitimacy charities 
would need to be more responsive to their ‘audiences’ by consulting opinion leaders and build 
reputation by advertising both product and image (Suchman, 1995). This approach is similar to that of 
another sector with previously high levels of moral legitimacy, the UK banking sector, after the 
financial crisis in 2008. Banks that were maintained by the state, such as RBS and Lloyds, received 
new senior management, implemented new practices and reconfigured systems of work (repairing of 
moral legitimacy) followed by a re-alignment of service to more closely address the needs of 
customers and greater advertising of the new image (gaining pragmatic legitimacy). Also, greater 
regulation and stricter accounting and reporting rules were introduced (gaining cognitive legitimacy). 
Applying a similar theoretical approach to improving the overall legitimacy of UK charities 
might prove fruitful. The previous moral legitimacy of charities was significant and therefore levels of 
both cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy will need to be improved to fill the remaining legitimacy 
gap. 
Once lost, moral legitimacy is slow to rebuild. In his table of strategies Suchman (1995) suggests that 
repairing moral legitimacy might be achieved through replacing senior management, implementing 
new practices and reconfiguring systems of work. Whilst this might be a way forward, public trust 
generally needs time to become re-established. In the interim, charities are faced with a legitimacy 
gap and stakeholders that are unwilling to transact with them. Referring to the theoretical model and 
Suchman’s strategies, a lower moral legitimacy might be supplemented with higher levels of both 
cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy. 
The aim of improving cognitive legitimacy could be behind the drive of some charities to 
mimic their commercial counterparts’ behaviours by becoming formalised and professionalised.  For 
larger charities bidding for public contracts, the ability to deliver formalised and certified levels of 
service generates greater cognitive legitimacy in the eyes of the contractee, i.e. those governmental 
offices delivering public services.  This would suggest the likelihood of a polarisation of charitable 
entities, according to their size and level of contracted public service contracts, with these factors 
causing a commercialisation of larger charities. Concerns over this issue were raised with the 
introduction of the Big Society 2010 initiative. Exeter Council for Voluntary Services warned of “a 
larger gulf between large, ‘professionalised’ or ‘corporate’ charitable companies, and small, local, 
entirely voluntary community groups” (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 
2011, 18). 
Combining a theoretical analysis of trustee roles with Suchman’s legitimacy strategies 
(1995) behaviours may be embedded within organisational practices to help to improve overall 
legitimacy for UK charities (see FIGURE B on the following page). 
Pragmatic Legitimacy: Stakeholder Satisfaction 
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Gaining pragmatic legitimacy involves ensuring delivery of what audiences need and 
demand (Suchman, 1995). Audiences for charities are key stakeholders and so to gain pragmatic 
legitimacy charities need to be more responsive to key stakeholder wishes. He suggests consulting 
opinion leaders and co-opting constituents. This is not dissimilar to engaging with service 
beneficiaries through scrutiny groups (opinion leaders) and creating service user board memberships 
(co-opting constituents). Also advised is the advertising of both the product, and importantly the 
image, that is to be projected (Suchman, 1995). He calls for organisations wishing to gain, and 
maintain, pragmatic legitimacy to ‘communicate honestly’ and ‘stockpile trust’. 
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FIGURE B: Embedding Legitimacy in Trustee Governance 
 
Source: Author 
Monitoring & 
Compliance 
Stakeholder 
Involvement 
External 
Engagement 
Empowerment 
to Manage 
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Interestingly, the strategic model to gain pragmatic legitimacy includes the advice to select 
the market it wishes to engage in carefully and ‘locate friendly audiences’ (Suchman, 1995). This 
might be indicative of the ‘mission drift’ (Bruce & Chew, 2011) that is experienced by charities 
tempted into delivering services outside of their core areas due to better contractual terms or safer 
‘audiences’. 
Re-invigorating Moral Legitimacy: Monitoring & Compliance 
Once established the mission and strategic objectives of the charity are monitored against 
performance. Conformance with legal and regulatory requirements is observed as the trustee board 
provide management with effective challenge and oversight (Monitoring & Compliance). Suchman 
(1995) suggests defining ‘goals’ that will generate ‘proper outcomes’. These could be ‘embedded’ in 
policies that reflect moral approaches and practices. Generating behaviours that exhibit ‘moral 
legitimacy’ might include the board in setting and reviewing policies to ensure best practice and 
compliance is maintained. Also, regulatory submissions must be made in accordance with 
requirements and deadlines. Proper, independent audits are an important part of maintaining moral 
legitimacy. 
Building Cognitive Legitimacy: External Engagement 
In a dynamic environment, where contracts need to be won and regulatory churn is the 
norm, trustee boards need to have an outward facing awareness and scan their planning horizon for 
potential threats and opportunities (External Engagement). The ‘stockpiling of interconnections’ 
(Suchman, 1995) is offered as a way of maintaining cognitive legitimacy and this translates into 
networking with important contacts to ensure a ready flow of local grants, contracts, talented 
employees and enthusiastic volunteers. New models of working are ‘popularised’ through promotion 
of the charity’s proactive image. 
Building Cognitive Legitimacy: Empowerment to Manage 
In large and complex charities, the trustee board needs to not only set the strategic position, 
but also provide the framework of policies, delegations and risk management priorities that will 
empower management to successfully run the organisation at an operational level (Empowerment to 
Manage). The ‘formalisation’ and ‘professionalisation’ of operations is suggested by Suchman (1995) 
as a way to supplement cognitive legitimacy. Strategic plans are formalised and made explicit as 
management is empowered to act without referral to the board. Levels of authority and financial 
delegation are also formalised. Professional practices are engaged to define risks and how they should 
be mitigated. 
Although attempting to re-affirm moral legitimacy, through evidence of organisational 
integrity in Monitoring & Compliance is an obvious approach, as is Empowering Management 
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through the formalisation of governance processes, it is important that charities emphasise their own 
values in these attempts, rather than mimic their commercial counterparts. A focus on achievement of 
organisational objectives, and the use of a ‘golden thread’ approach to embed processes that retain a 
focus on what is important to charities might be useful. In this way, the formalisation of governance 
structures adds to cognitive legitimacy, as something that is ‘accepted to be necessary’. 
Conclusions 
The UK charity sector is under threat from reputational damage and a crisis of public 
confidence. Accountability is demanded regarding the significant flow of public funds into the sector.  
Protection for the sector can be achieved, not through a shielded, laissez-faire approach to 
governance, but conversely through the integrity of robust practices. Governance structures and 
internal control can provide those in positions of responsibility with comfort and assurance that they 
are doing what is expected and required of their position, and afford them some defence if things go 
wrong. There is societal demand for adequate regulation in the charity sector, not least due to the 
special allowances enjoyed by charities, such as tax relief and a lighter touch legal framework. The 
public need to have confidence that increasingly commercialised larger charities are deserving, not 
only their donations, but also the significant fiscal and statutory benefits bestowed upon them.  
Public trust needs time to be re-established. Charities are faced with a legitimacy gap and 
stakeholders that are unwilling to transact with them (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Developing the 
application of Suchman’s legitimacy strategies (1995), it could be shown that a lower moral 
legitimacy might be supplemented with higher levels of both cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy. 
Combining a theoretical analysis of trustee roles with Suchman’s legitimacy strategies (1995) it is 
possible to construct a set of example behaviours that may be embedded within organisational 
practices to help to improve overall perceived legitimacy for UK charities. 
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APPENDIX 
Linear Regression Model Specification 
Linear regression is used to analyse panel data for the years 2011-2013 and measure the 
effect of the independent variables on charity performance.  
The following data model was estimated prior to the findings: 
 
                                                       
                                               
 
   
 
Dependent Variables (DV) 
There are two dependent variables included in this data analysis as proxies for performance 
(PERF):  
 
DndV1. Allocative efficiency [aEFF] 
Reflecting the utilisation of charity funds for beneficiary services 
=  Total costs of charitable activity provision 
                          Total revenue 
 
A higher percentage indicates a greater allocative efficiency. 
 
In terms of the regression model it would be expected that where we see a positive 
correlation between [aEFF] and the independent variables this would indicate a positive correlation 
with performance. Donors typically want to see a high passthrough ratio, which represents the 
proportion of a charity’s income that is ultimately distributed to beneficiaries, and this is a standard 
indicator within the charity sector of how organisations are performing (Hyndman & Jones, 2011). 
 
DndV2. Technical efficiency  
Percentage of operating expenses compared to total revenue  
 
= Total operating expenses 
           Total revenue 
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A lower percentage indicates a greater technical efficiency. 
In terms of the regression model it would be expected that where we see a positive 
correlation between [tEFF] and the independent variables this would indicate a negative correlation 
with performance. The use of this particular metric represents more of a commercial approach to 
performance. The idea, of not expending all incoming resources, supports the concept of generating 
an accounting surplus or profit and is so inherently capitalistic in its nature.  
 
Independent Variables (IndV) 
TABLE I provides a summary of the independent variables in the regression model with 
their mode of calculation and rationale for inclusion in the model. 
TABLE I: Independent Variables in the Regression Model 
Independent Variable Description 
CONT Proportion of income derived from charitable contracts 
 
LEV Proportion of debt to total assets 
VOL Proportion of total workforce comprised from volunteers 
 
GOV Proportion of total expenditure assigned to governance 
 
ADV Proportion of expenditure to facilitate voluntary income 
 
SIZE Control for size: 
Ln(TA) Reflection of size using total assets (natural log) 
  
Ln(TINC) Reflection of size using total income (natural log) 
 
SECT Control for sector: 
Charity Commission classifications ranging from 101 to 116 
 
IndV1. Contract Income (CONT) 
Proportion of income derived from charitable contracts defined as: 
= Charitable contract income 
Total income 
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Independent Variable [CONT]: Rationale for Inclusion in the Model 
The marketisation trend in the UK echoes that of other developed western economies, such 
as the US, where market-based principles have been applied to reform public services (Eikenberry & 
Kluver, 2004). Whereas previously statutory funding was delivered by way of grants, now the move is 
toward the use of contracts (McKay et al., 2015). In 2009, NCVO identified that 70% of all 
government funding in this area was delivered via fulfilment of a contract. The proportion of income 
derived through contractual obligations is an indicator of the level of marketisation (Bruce & Chew, 
2011) experienced by charitable organisations. The changes in government funding of charities, 
which has moved from grants to contracts, has been accompanied by greater performance monitoring 
(Cornforth, 2003). The introduction of market-like mechanisms was ultimately to improve 
performance. 
Inclusion of this variable tests for correlation between increased marketisation and improved 
performance. 
IndV2. Leverage (LEV) 
Proportion of debt defined as: 
= Long term debt 
  Total net assets 
Independent Variable [LEV]: Rationale for Inclusion in the Model 
There is an argument that organisations holding debt are monitored and evaluated by the 
debtholders, and so this provides an additional governance mechanism, through this set of key 
stakeholders (Reddy et al., 2013; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Begley & Feltham, 1999; Jensen, 1986). 
The proposition is that the additional governance associated with debt leads to greater operational 
efficiency.  
 
Independent Variable [GOV]: Rationale for Inclusion in the Model 
Bruce & Chew (2011) suggest that charities may need to adopt private sector governance 
and management systems to remain economically viable.  
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Inclusion of this variable tests for improvements in performance generated through a greater 
organisational focus on governance. 
 
 
IndV5. Advertising and non-trading fundraising (ADV) 
Proportion of expenditure used to facilitate voluntary income defined as: 
=Voluntary income costs 
     Total operational expenditure 
 
Independent Variable [ADV]: Rationale for Inclusion in the Model 
Hind states that the annual income of charities in England and Wales alone was in excess of 
£50 billion in his paper of 2011. This has created an increasingly competitive ‘market’ for charities in 
terms of attracting donors, other funding, volunteers and sector specific resources. It is speculated 
whether increased competition, through such marketisation, leads to greater operational efficiency. 
The proxy used for competition is the level of costs associated with raising donations, such as 
advertising expenditure, which should rise as charities compete for donor income. Inclusion of this 
variable tests for improvements in performance generated through increased competition in the sector. 
 
IndV6a. Control for Size - ASSETS (Ln (TA)) 
Reflection of size using total assets defined as: 
Natural log (Ln) of Total assets 
IndV6b. Control for Size - Income (Ln (TINC)) 
Reflection of size using total income defined as: 
Natural log (Ln) of Total income 
 
Controls for size (Ln (TA) and (Ln (TINC): Rationale for inclusion in the model 
The data set represents financial information from around 8,000 charities over the three 
years from 2011-13. The total number of charity-years is 27,424. Within this set the size of 
organisations varies considerably. To control for size within the model two measures are introduced: 
Total Assets (TA); and Total Income (TINC).  
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TABLE II: Descriptive Statistics of the Full Financial Data Set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Interquartile 
range 
            
Dependent      
tEFF 1.16 1.11 -0.31 68.90 0.99-1.27 
aEFF 0.84 0.90 -0.53 60.02 0.72-0.98 
      
Control      
CONT 0.50 0.56 0.00 1.02 0.00-0.94 
LEV 0.47 0.00 -0.10 1,589 0.00-0.04 
VOL 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00-0.25 
GOV 0.02 0.01 -1.63 1.00 0.00-0.02 
ADV 0.034 0.000 -0.19 1.66 0.00-0.02 
      
Size      
TINC  £   5,495,812   £     1,404,885   £0   £          951,392,000  £0.79bn-£3.6bn 
TA  £ 12,901,623   £     1,443,850   £0   £     15,041,152,752  £0.45bn-£5.74bn 
      
Sector      
101 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00  
102 0.66 1.00 0.00 1.00  
103 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00  
104 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00  
105 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00  
106 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00  
107 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00  
108 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00  
109 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00  
110 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00  
111 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00  
112 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00  
113 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00  
114 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00  
115 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00  
116 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00  
            
      
 
CONT is the proportion of total income derived from charitable contracts. 
LEV is the proportion of long term debt against total assets. 
VOL is the proportion of total workforce comprised of volunteers. 
GOV is the proportion of total expenditure assigned to governance. 
ADV is the proportion of expenditure used to generate voluntary income
Ln (TINC) is the natural log of the charity's total income. 
Ln (TA) is the natural log of the charity's total assets.
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TABLE III: Robust Regression Results: Full Financial Data Set  
  aEFF Std.   tEFF Std.   
     β Error      β Error   
 
      
Intercept 1.060** 0.012  1.370*** 0.020  
(t-value) (88.48)   (68.85)   
 
CONT 0.085 *** 0.003  0.076*** 0.004  
(t-value) (33.34)   (18.00)   
 
LEV -0.001*** 0.000  0.000 0.000  
(t-value) (-8.56)   (-1.15)   
 
VOL -0.025*** 0.003  0.041*** 0.005  
(t-value) (-8.62)   (8.48)   
 
GOV -1.273** 0.017  -0.528*** 0.027  
(t-value) (-76.88)   (-19.22)   
 
ADV -1.021*** 0.009  -0.045*** 0.016  
(t-value) (-109.15)   (-2.92)   
 
Ln(TINC) 0.003*** 0.001  -0.017*** 0.002  
(t-value) (2.92)   (-10.28)   
 
Ln(TA) -0.016*** 0.001  -0.001 0.001  
(t-value) (29.84)   (-0.81)   
 
Residual Standard       
Error 0.127   0.210   
 
Degrees        
of freedom  27,400      27,400     
19 
 
 
TABLE IV: Pairwise correlation of independent variables for full, financial data set 
 
CONT is the proportion of total income derived from charitable contracts. 
LEV is the proportion of long term debt against total assets. 
VOL is the proportion of total workforce comprised of volunteers. 
GOV is the proportion of total expenditure assigned to governance. 
ADV is the proportion of expenditure used to generate voluntary income
Ln (TINC) is the natural log of the charity's total income. 
Ln (TA) is the natural log of the charity's total assets.
*,**,*** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively
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Cont Lev Vol Gov 
Ln       
(TINC)
Ln      
(TA) Adv 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116
Pearson Correlation
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 27424
Pearson Correlation
.002 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .803
N 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.035
** -.010 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .087
N 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.116
** -.002 -.027
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .732 .000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
.149
** .005 -.088
**
-.137
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .415 .000 .000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.088
**
-.050
**
-.087
**
-.018
**
.549
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .003 0.000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 ####
Pearson Correlation
-.262
** -.008 .072
** .004 -.031
**
-.048
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 .207 .000 .510 .000 .000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.124
** -.006 .057
**
.028
**
-.115
**
-.030
**
.012
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .308 .000 .000 .000 .000 .047
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
.122
** .002 -.032
**
-.026
**
.079
**
-.014
*
-.046
**
.015
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .765 .000 .000 .000 .019 .000 .015
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.111
**
-.013
*
.095
** .004 -.004 .014
*
.076
**
.083
**
-.017
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .038 .000 .528 .556 .022 .000 .000 .005
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
.064
** -.008 .072
**
-.023
**
-.016
**
-.033
**
.012
*
.117
** .003 .335
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .196 .000 .000 .007 .000 .040 .000 .600 0.000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.123
** .000 .052
**
.023
**
-.067
**
-.035
** .002 .270
**
.073
**
.176
**
.164
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .985 .000 .000 .000 .000 .784 0.000 .000 .000 .000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.193
** -.006 -.019
** .008 .021
**
.025
**
.051
**
.121
**
.076
**
.155
**
.072
**
.323
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .311 .002 .193 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 0.000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
.152
**
.016
**
-.029
**
-.017
**
.057
**
.072
**
-.050
**
.046
**
-.084
**
.096
**
.196
**
.226
**
.048
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .008 .000 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 0.000 .000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.247
** -.005 -.063
**
.024
**
-.053
**
.100
** .005 .067
**
-.043
**
-.062
**
-.096
**
.165
**
.237
** .003 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 .412 .000 .000 .000 .000 .421 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 0.000 .625
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.076
** -.010 .054
** .005 -.028
** -.011 .001 .054
**
.170
**
-.040
** -.011 -.017
** .001 -.052
**
-.033
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .100 .000 .429 .000 .063 .869 .000 .000 .000 .062 .005 .916 .000 .000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
.001 -.004 .033
** -.005 -.048
**
-.060
** .002 .128
**
.122
**
.071
**
.149
**
.079
**
.017
**
.060
** .001 .246
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .899 .509 .000 .404 .000 .000 .692 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .005 .000 .806 0.000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.103
** -.005 .025
** .006 -.005 .040
**
.054
** .010 .013
* -.005 -.004 -.015
*
.023
**
-.026
**
-.023
**
.032
**
.045
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .419 .000 .356 .407 .000 .000 .099 .026 .382 .556 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.084
** -.004 .057
**
.015
* -.005 .059
**
.017
**
.055
**
.115
**
-.017
** -.011 .045
**
.046
**
-.016
**
-.048
**
.284
**
.141
**
.229
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .502 .000 .015 .442 .000 .006 .000 .000 .005 .070 .000 .000 .008 .000 0.000 .000 0.000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
.039
** .001 .063
** .000 -.039
**
-.097
** -.006 .191
**
.212
**
.098
**
.175
**
.290
**
.125
**
.121
**
-.060
**
.144
**
.236
**
.032
**
.231
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .861 .000 .945 .000 .000 .309 .000 .000 .000 .000 0.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 0.000 .000 0.000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.054
** -.002 -.026
** -.003 .007 .052
** -.004 .037
**
-.016
**
.041
**
.045
**
.020
** .000 .048
**
.013
*
.039
**
.073
**
.053
**
.074
** .001 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .717 .000 .661 .259 .000 .531 .000 .007 .000 .000 .001 .950 .000 .026 .000 .000 .000 .000 .883
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
-.037
** -.002 .044
** -.006 -.028
**
-.028
**
.014
*
.092
**
.071
**
.078
**
.094
**
.133
**
.124
**
.048
**
.043
**
.064
**
.046
**
.013
*
.086
**
.149
**
.046
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .680 .000 .299 .000 .000 .016 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .030 .000 .000 .000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
Pearson Correlation
.011 -.004 .075
** -.010 -.030
**
-.028
** -.009 .065
**
.077
**
.051
**
.094
**
.033
** -.009 .026
** -.011 .166
**
.293
**
.048
**
.133
**
.129
**
.089
**
.140
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .069 .519 .000 .113 .000 .000 .158 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .153 .000 .060 .000 0.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 #### 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424 27424
116
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
110
111
112
113
114
115
104
105
106
107
108
109
Ln(TINC)
Ln(TA)
Adv
101
102
103
Correlations
Cont
Lev
Vol
Gov 
